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I. Service of Process Abroad,
A. INTRODUCTION
In federal courts, Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs the service of
process outside of the United States in civil actions.' In state courts, the particular proce-
dures of the forum state apply. In either case, however, where service is to be made in a
foreign state that is a signatory to the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad ofJudicial
and Extrajudicial Documents (Hague Convention),2 the Supreme Court has directed that
the Hague Convention provides the exclusive means for effecting service on the territory
of a signatory state.' Where service on a foreign party may be effected in the United States
without the need for service abroad, the Supreme Court has held that the Hague Conven-
tion is not applicable.
B. DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION
1. Service by Mail under Hague Convention Article 10(a)
One issue that continues to cause disagreement among federal and state courts is whether
article 10(a) of the Hague Convention, preserving "the freedom to send judicial documents,
*Individual contributors will be referred to at the discussion of each relevant section.
a. Contributed by Phillip Dye, partner and Jennifer Davidow and Holly Rumbaugh, associates, at Vimson
& Elkins LLP in Houston, Texas.
1. There are several portions of Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that apply to service of
process upon an international entity located outside of the United States including FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f) (service
upon individuals in a foreign country); FED. R. Crv. P. 4(h) (service of process upon corporations and associ-
ations); FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k) (territorial limits of effective service). In addition, service of process on foreign
states and their agencies and instrumentalities must generally be effected in accordance with the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C.§ 1608 (2006). The Federal Rules adopt state procedure in diversity-based
cases.
2. Hague Convention on the Service Abroad ofJudicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial
Matters, Nov. 15, 1965 (entered into force February 10, 1969) [hereinafter Hague Convention].
3. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694 (1988).
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by postal channels, directly to persons abroad," 4 authorizes the service of judicial documents
by mail, or whether it merely authorizes the mailing of documents other than process.
Early in 2005, a New York state trial-level court sided with the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals and held that service by mail to a Canadian defendant was sufficient.' In its short
opinion, the court noted that Canada had "expressly declined to object 'to service by postal
channels."' Accordingly, the court cited Ackermann v. Levine' when stating that service by
mail to an Ontario corporation was effective.' The court also observed that service by mail
is permissible in Ontario, and thus found that the plaintiff's method of service was justified
under article 19 of the Hague Convention, which permits service by any method allowed
by the internal laws of the country in which service is being made.9
The district court of New Hampshire also followed the approach of the Second and
Ninth Circuits to hold that article 10(a) authorizes service by mail.' 0 In so doing, the court
noted a split within its sister district courts in the First Circuit." Two courts agreed with
the BankstonI2-Nuovo Pignone" approach and held that article 10(a) did not authorize service
by mail.14 Two others found the approach of Ackermann" and its progeny more persuasive
and held that article 10(a) did authorize service by mail." Although the New Hampshire
court stated that article 10(a) authorizes service by mail generally, it held that service in the
case at bar was insufficient because the mailing requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f) were
not satisfied."7 First, the plaintiffs had mailed the service documents themselves, as opposed
to having the clerk of the court mail them." Second, the form of mail the plaintiffs used
lacked the required signed receipt.' 9
In November 2005, a district court in Ohio, also lacking clear circuit precedent, held
that service by mail on a corporate defendant in Qutbec, Canada was authorized by article
10(a) of the Hague Convention.20 The Ohio court's holding was contrary to that of three
of its sister courts within the Sixth Circuit.2' The court focused on the intent of the Hague
4. Emphasis added. Article 10(a) of the Hague Convention provides in pertinent part: "Provided the State
of destination does not object, the present Convention shall not interfere with (a) the freedom to send judicial
documents, by postal channels, directly to persons abroad ... " Hague Convention, supra note 2, at art. 10.
5. Fernandez v. Univan Leasing, 790 N.Y.S.2d 155, 156 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005).
6. Id.
7. Ackermarm v. Levine, 788 E2d 830 (2d Cir. 1986).
8. Fernandez, 790 N.Y.S.2d at 156.
9. Id.
10. Ballard v. Tyco Int'l, Ltd., No. MD-02-1335-PB, 2005 WL 1863492 (D.N.H. Aug. 4, 2005) (not des-
ignated for publication).
11. Id. at*3.
12. Bankston v. Toyota Motor Corp., 889 E2d 172 (8th Cir. 1989).
13. Nuovo Pignone, SPA v. Storman Asia M/V, 3 10 E3d 374 (5th Cir. 2002).
14. Golub v. Isuzu Motors, 924 E Supp. 324 (D. Mass. 1996); Cooper v. Makita, U.S.A., Inc. 117 F.R.D.
16 (D. Me. 1987).
15. Ackermann, 788 E2d at 838.
16. Borschow Hosp. & Med. Supplies, Inc. v. Burdick-Siemens Corp., 143 ER.D. 472 (D.P.R. 1992); Melia
v. Les Grandes Chais de France, 135 ER.D. 28 (D.R.I. 1991).
17. Ballard, 2005 WI. 1863492, at *4.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Sibley v. Alcan, Inc., 400 E Supp. 2d 1051 (N.D. Ohio 2005).
21. Cupp v. Alberto-Culver USA, Inc., 308 E Supp. 2d 873 (W.D. Tenn. 2004); Uppendahl v. Am. Honda
Motor Co., 291 E Supp. 2d 531 (W.D. Ky. 2003); Wilson v. Honda Motor Co., 776 F Supp. 339 (E.D. Tenn.
1991).
VOL. 40, NO. 2
DISPUTES 277
Convention and held that service of process by registered mail "provides an inexpensive
and simpler method for service abroad, without running the risk that defendants will not
receive actual notice of litigation."22 Like the New York State court, the Ohio court held
that because Canada had not objected to article 10(a), service by mail was sufficient.3 Unlike
the New York state court, 4 however, the Ohio court expressly declined to consider whether
service by mail was authorized by the local laws of the forum in which service was being
made (Qubec).25
These decisions from the past year reflect the continuing diversity of judicial opinion
regarding the service of process by mail under the Hague Convention. Absent controlling
guidance from the courts of appeals or the Supreme Court, this uncertainty counsels
practitioners to exercise caution and avoid reliance on service by mail under the Hague
Convention. 6
2. Direct Service under Article 1 0(c) of the Hague Convention
In LW Partners v. Debit Direct Ltd., the Connecticut district court held that the plaintiffs
could effect service of process on defendants in the Isle of Man by direct delivery under
article 10(c) of the Hague Convention.2 Article 10(c) provides that, if the state of desti-
nation does not object, service may be made "by any person interested in a judicial pro-
ceeding ... directly through judicial officers, officials, or other competent persons of the
State of destination."28 The plaintiffs argued that the United Kingdom's declaration that
"documents sent for service through official channels will be accepted in a territory listed
in the Annex by the designated authority and only from judicial, consular, or diplomatic
officers of other Contracting States" constituted a total rejection of direct service under
article 10(c).29 The court rejected that argument, noting that U.S. courts have consistently
interpreted that reservation as regarding only "'documents sent for service through official
channels,' which have been defined as 'documents from an embassy or consular official."'30
Thus, the court held that the Hague Convention authorized service by direct delivery in
the Isle of Man.31 Service in this case was made by the Coroner of Middle Sheading. The
court found that "a coroner is a judicial officer or otherwise competent person" under Manx
law. Therefore, service was proper."
22. Sibley, 400 E Supp. at 1054.
23. Id.
24. Fernandez, 790 N.Y.S.2d at 156.
25. Sibley, 400 E Supp. at 1052.
26. For a more extensive, recent survey of the issues raised under article 10(a), see generally Alexandra
Amiel, Note, Recent Developments in the Interpretation ofArticl 10(a) of the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad
of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, 24 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. RPv. 387
(2001).
27. IM Partners v. Debit Direct Ltd., 394 F Supp. 2d 503 (D. Conn. 2005).
28. Id. at 512 (citing Hague Convention, art. 10(c)).
29. Id. (citing United Kingdom Declaration, (2)(d)).
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C. DEVELOPMENTS UNDER RULE 4 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
1. Service by Electronic Mail under Rule 4(0(3)
Service by e-mail appears to be gradually increasing. Since the Ninth Circuit's 2002
decision in Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio International Interlink,33 a number of courts throughout
the United States have allowed service on an international defendant via electronic mail.
The common thread appears to be multiple, good faith, unsuccessful attempts by the plain-
tiff, and a recalcitrant defendant who engages in e-commerce.
At the end of 2004, a district court in Tennessee, apparently the first in the Sixth Circuit,
allowed a plaintiff to serve the defendant by e-mail in a case where other means of service
had failed. 4 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant was infringing upon and diluting its
NETSTER trademark by directing web users to numerous pornographic websites.3 The
plaintiff petitioned the court for an order for service by e-mail under Rule 4(f)(3), which
allows service to be made on an individual in another country by "means not prohibited by
international agreement as may be directed by the court."36 The court noted that the Hague
Convention did not apply because the defendant's address was unknown. 37 After detailing
nearly a dozen attempts to reach the defendant by registered mail and/or by e-mail (in-
cluding a futile attempt under the Hague Convention), the court concluded that service by
e-mail was authorized under Rule 4(f)(3), and, indeed, was "the method of service most
likely to reach defendant."3 8 The court also echoed the Ninth Circuit's language in Rio and
held e-mail was the only means of effecting service of process "when faced with an inter-
national e-business scofflaw, playing hide-and-seek with the federal court .... ."19
More recently, a West Virginia district court, also without circuit precedent, held that
service by e-mail was authorized under Rule 4(0(3) on an Australian defendant.- The
plaintiff, Miss West Virginia 2003, sued multiple defendants, alleging that they falsely iden-
tified her on multiple websites in a graphic Internet video that juxtaposed her image as Miss
West Virginia with sexually explicit images.41 Australia is not a signatory to the Hague
Convention, and no other international treaty applied, so the court found that service under
Rule 4(f)(3) was permissible. 42 The record in this case "establishe[d] that the defendants are
'sophisticated participants in e-commerce.'" 43 As such, there was a "reliable channel of
communication" to the defendant by way of "e-mail addresses linked to established websites
that [the defendant] uses to conduct business." 44 Finally, the court observed that because
the plaintiff had attempted service on many occasions, the defendant had actual knowledge
that he was "sought for the receipt of legal documents from the United States."45 "Rather
33. Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 E3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2002).
34. Popular Enters., LLC v. Webcom Media Group, Inc., 225 ER.D. 560 (E.D. Tenn. 2004).
35. Id. at 561.
36. Id. (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 4(0(3)).
37. Id. at 562.
38. Id. at 563.
39. Id. (quoting Rio, 284 E3d at 1018).
40. Williams v. Adver. Sex LLC, 231 ER.D. 483 (N.D. W Va. 2005).
41. Id. at 485.
42. Id. at 486.
43. Id. at 487.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 488.
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than ease the process," the court stated, the defendant's knowledge "has only erected bar-
riers to formal service."46 Accordingly, the court issued an order for service by e-mail under
Rule 4(f(3).47
Another court recognized that service by electronic mail may be appropriate in some
cases, but refused to allow it in a declaratory judgment action against a defendant in Saudi
Arabia, who was a subject in the plaintiff's book regarding the financing of terrorism. s The
plaintiff argued that her service options were limited because Saudi Arabia is not a signatory
to the Hague Convention, and because it would be extremely difficult to find someone
willing to attempt personal service on the defendant in Saudi Arabia. 49 Accordingly, she
sought to serve the defendant by e-mail to information@binmahfouz.info, an address listed
on a website allegedly affiliated with the defendant.50 The court was sympathetic, but held
that service via e-mail would not meet the constitutional standard that service be "reason-
ably calculated under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of
the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections."" The court char-
acterized the cases where e-mail service had been allowed as "involv[ing] e-mail addresses
undisputedly connected to the defendants and that the defendants used for business pur-
poses.""2 By contrast, there was no basis for the court to conclude that the defendant main-
tained the website the plaintiff cited, monitored its information@binmahfouz.info e-mail
address, or would be likely to receive information sent to that address." Accordingly, the
court would not permit service by e-mail, s* but instead ordered that service be made through
the defendant's attorneys in the United States and the United Kingdom."
2. Service through Attorney under Rule 4((3)
In two companion cases, the Eastern District of Virginia permitted the plaintiffs to serve
a Pakistani defendant through his U.S. attorneys.5 6 The defendant, Dagra, was a "busi-
nessman who previously owned several businesses in Virginia, but is currently residing
somewhere in Pakistan."" Dagra sought dismissal in the first case for failure to properly
effect service. ss Dagra admitted that the address the plaintiffs tried was previously a good
one, but said it was no longer.5 9 The court detailed the litany of the plaintiffs' attempts to
determine Dagra's address to no avail.60 Pakistan is a party to the Hague Convention, but
46. Williams, 231 ER.D. at 488.
47. Id.
48. Ehrenfeld v. Salim a Bin Mahfouz, No. 04 Civ. 9641(RCC), 2005 WIL 696769 (S.D.N.Y March 23,
2003) (not designated for publication).
49. Id. at *2.
50. Id. at *3.
51. Id. at "3 (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)).
52. Id. at "3.
53. Id.
54. Ehrenfeld, 2005 WL 696769, at *4. The court also refused to allow service by Federal Express to a
business address in Saudi Arabia, because on the state of the record, the court had "no way of knowing whether
service of process to this address will have any chance of reaching [the] Defendant." Id.
55. Id.; see infra Part D.2.
56. FMAC Loan Receivables v. Dagra, 228 F.R.D. 531 (E.D. Va. 2005); BP Prods. N. Am., Inc. v. Dagra,
232 ER.D. 263, (E.D. Va. 2005).
57. FMACLoan, 228 ER.D. at 532.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 533.
60. Id. at 533-34.
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the court found that the Convention did not apply because Dagra's address was unknown.61
The court concluded that under the facts of the first case, Dagra would be given proper
notice of the case if service was made on his U.S. attorney.62 A clear undercurrent of the
decision is the court's annoyance with what it perceived to be Dagra's catch me if you can
attitude .63
The second Virginia case is shorter and, once again, the court was obviously frustrated
with Dagra: "This Court has no doubt that the defendant is willfully evading the service of
process in this case."- In cursory fashion, therefore, the court again concluded that service
on Dagra's U.S. lawyer would be appropriate under Rule 4(f)(3). 65
3. Service by Courier under Rule 4(0(2) and Rule 4(0(3)
In Export-Import Bank of the United States v. Asia Pulp & Paper Co., the federal court for
the Southern District of New York considered the plaintiff's attempted service by both
international mail and DHL courier under both Rule 4(0(2) and 4(f)(3). 66 The defendant
was an Indonesian company-Indonesia is not a party to the Hague Convention or any
other applicable service treaty or agreement.67 The court found that the attempted service
by international mail was ineffective because it was initiated by the plaintiff instead of the
clerk of the court, and because the defendants did not sign receipts. 68 Next, the court also
held that the attempted service by DHL was ineffective both because the clerk of the court
did not initiate service, as required by Rule 4(f)(2)(C)(ii), and because Indonesian law pro-
hibits service by international courier.69 The court expressly declined to decide whether an
international courier like DHL qualified as a form of mail for purposes of Rule 4(f)(2)(C)(ii).7°
Although the court found that service was ineffective under Rule 4(f)(2), that did not
"preclude a finding that service by mail or DHL may be effective under Rule 4(f)(3)."11
Determining that the plaintiff's attempts at service were "hardly whimsical," 72 the court
found these means honored the spirit of the parties' agreements that apparently provided
for "simple and inexpensive means of service." 73 The court held that, under the circum-
stances of the case, service was effective under Rule 4(f)(3) even if it violated Indonesian
law.
61. Id. at 534.
62. Id.
63. FMAC Loan, 228 ER.D. at 534. "While Dagra argues that FMAC should be required to do more to
obtain his current address, upon questioning by the Court, he could not define what additional steps should
be required." Id. "It is also reasonable to infer in light of the numerous challenges that Dagra has made in his
defense that he already has sufficient notice of the case. Dagra has not only filed two motions to dismiss based
on deficient service, but has also filed several motions directly attacking the substance of the Complaint." Id.
at 535. "In sum, Dagra cannot skirt the jurisdiction of this Court. From the facts of this case, it is obvious that
Dagra is well aware of the current suit, but has purposely acted to conceal his whereabouts." Id. at 536.
64. BP Prods. N. Am., Inc., 232 ER.D. at 264.
65. Id. at 265.
66. Export-Import Bank of the United States v. Asia Pulp & Paper Co., No. 03 Civ. 8554 (LTS) (JCF),
2005 VL 1123755 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 2005) (not designated for publication).




71. Id. at *4.
72. Export-Import Bank, 2005 WL 1123755, at *4.
73. Id. at "5.
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In short, the agreements between the parties provided for simple and inexpensive means of
service. The Subsidiaries thwarted service under these agreements. It would therefore be un-
duly burdensome to require Ex-Im to initiate letters rogatory in order to have the pleadings
served by a bailiff in Indonesia. The alternative-service by an international courier-has
already proven effective. Even if it is technically in violation of Indonesian service requirements, any
offense to that country's sovereignty is minimal. Such service is not disruptive, and any party that
engages in international transactions must anticipate the use of generally accepted forms of
service, especially where it has, through its own actions, frustrated the methods of service
provided for in the underlying transaction documents.
4
In the end, the court allowed process to be served uIder Rule 4(f)(3), even though it had
already held that the same service failed under Rule 4(f)(2) and violated Indonesian law.
The court appeared to justify this rogue decision by the recalcitrance of the defendants.
Nonetheless, the plaintiff's subsequent ability to enforce any judgment outside the U.S.
may trigger a challenge based on service contrary to Indonesian law.
II. Personal Jurisdictionb
While 2005 saw no major changes in the law of personal jurisdiction, two cases may be
of particular interest to participants in international litigation.
A. CONSENT TO PERSONAL JURISDICTION
In Dow Chemical Co. v. Calderon,"5 the Ninth Circuit considered a suit brought by Dow
Chemical Company, Shell Oil Company, and Shell Chemical Company (the Companies)
against 1030 Nicaraguan citizens, seeking a declaration that (1) the Companies were not
liable for any injuries to the Nicaraguans caused by a toxic pesticide commonly known as
DBPC and (2) any judgments of Nicaraguan courts to the contrary would not be enforce-
able in the United States. The Nicaraguan defendants sought dismissal on the ground that
the district court lacked personal jurisdiction.
The underlying dispute in the case centered on the question of whether the Companies
were liable for injuries suffered by Nicaraguan citizens, allegedly caused by exposure to
DBCP, a pesticide manufactured by the Companies and used by fruit and vegetable growers
throughout the world during the 1950s through the 1970s. In the 1990s, several Nicaraguan
citizens had brought suit in Texas against the Companies for alleged continued use of DBCP
in Nicaragua after it was banned in the United States.7 6 But that suit was dismissed in 1995
on the basis offorum non conveniens, after the U.S. court determined that the Nicaraguan
courts offered an adequate and more convenient alternative forum."
In response to the 1995 forum non conveniens dismissal of the Texas action, the Nicaraguan
National Assembly in 2001 enacted the Special Law for the Conduct of Lawsuits Filed By
Persons Affected By The Use of Pesticides Manufactured with a DPCP Base (Special Law
364), the legislation on which the Companies relied for the appeal to the Ninth Circuit.
74. Id. (emphasis added).
b. Contributed by Nancy S. Eisenhauer, Attorney, State of New York.
75. Dow Chem. Co. v. Calderon, 422 E3d 827 (9th Cir. 2005).
76. See Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 890 F. Supp. 1324, 1335-36 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
77. Id. at 1362, 1372-73.
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Special Law 364 requires that defendants in suits brought under the Special Law deposit
the sum of $100,000 with the Nicaraguan courts as a "procedural prerequisite for being
able to take part in the lawsuit" and an additional $20 million "to guarantee potential
judgments."' 8 Defendants that do not deposit such sums "must subject themselves uncon-
ditionally to the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States of America for the final
judgment of the case in question, expressly waiving the defense of forum non conveniens
invoked in those courts." 79
Suing under Special Law 364, Nicaraguans citizens have actually obtained more than
$175 million in judgments in the Nicaraguan courts against U.S. companies, including the
defendants in the 2005 Ninth Circuit case. These Nicaraguan judgments, however, have
been in the nature of default judgments because U.S. companies have chosen not to par-
ticipate in litigation in Nicaragua under the onerous terms of Special Law 364.80
Seeking to preempt any future attempts to enforce the Nicaraguan judgments, the Com-
panies filed the declaratory action at issue in the Ninth Circuit appeal.8' The Companies
argued that the Nicaraguan citizens consented to personal jurisdiction in the courts of the
United States by virtue of either (a) their decision to sue appellants in a Nicaraguan court
under the special legislation Special law 364 or (b) their decision to defend on the merits a
declaratory judgment action brought against them by a third party in the same U.S. district
court, concerning the same set of underlying Nicaraguan judgments. Both the district court
and the Ninth Circuit found for the Nicaraguans, concluding that they did not consent to
personal jurisdiction in the Dow Chemical Co. case.82
Turning to the question of personal jurisdiction raised in the case, the Companies did
not contend that the court had personal jurisdiction on the basis of minimum contacts.
Instead, the companies argued that the Nicaraguans had consented to personal jurisdiction
in one of two ways. First, they argued that Special Law 364 acted as a forum selection clause
and that, by choosing to sue under the Law, the Nicaraguans were bound by its terms. The
second argument was that 465 of the Nicaraguans, who previously had consented to per-
sonal jurisdiction in a separate declaratory action brought by Dole Food Company, 3 had
also impliedly consented to jurisdiction in the declaratory action brought by the Companies.
The Companies argued, when the Nicaraguan plaintiffs (defendants-appellees here) had
opted to sue under Special Law 364, they had also opted into this forum selection scheme.
While the Companies were forced to concede that "it is an 'obvious proposition[]' that 'the
Nicaraguan Legislature cannot confer personal jurisdiction over [Nicaraguan citizens] in
United States courts,"'- they urged the court to analogize Special Law 364 to a forum
selection clause in a private, commercial contract. While noting that the Companies' ar-
guments were creative, 85 the court disagreed with the argument by distinguishing private,
commercial contracts from Special Law 364, and also by examining the language of Special
78. Dow Cem. Co., 422 E3d at 829-30 (quoting an English translation of Special Law No. 364).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 830.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 836.
83. The Nicaraguans in that case waived objection to personal jurisdiction by filing a motion under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Id.
84. Dow Chem. Co., 422 E3d at 832.
85. Id.
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Law 364, which expressly spoke only to the question of the Companies consent to juris-
diction in the United States, not that of the Nicaraguan plaintiffs s6 With respect to this
argument, the Companies argued that the Ninth Circuit should "adopt for the first time
in this circuit, the holdings of two out-of-circuit decisions":87 General Contracting & Trading
Co. v. Interpole, from the First Circuit;88 and International Transactions Ltd. v. Embotelladora
Agral Regiomontana S.A. de C. V, from the federal district court for the Northern District
of Texas.19 While the Ninth Circuit "assume[d] without deciding that this circuit would
follow Interpole and Embotelladora," it nevertheless concluded that "the analysis contained
in those cases does not aid the Companies."10 In Interpole and Embotelladora, the relevant
courts found that personal jurisdiction exists "where a defendant also independently seeks
affirmative relief in a separate action before the same court concerning the same transaction
or occurrence," regardless when that affirmative relief is sought or the identity of the plain-
tiff.91 Moreover, in Interpole and Embotelladora, the question whether the defendant had also
sought affirmative relief was deemed relevant to a minimum contacts analysis, not to the
question of consent to personal jurisdiction.9 Finding that the 465 Nicaraguan defendants
had only "defended against two separate actions concerning a single foreign judgment in
the same court," rather than seeking affirmative relief, and that the Companies had es-
chewed the question of minimum contacts, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the
case for lack of personal jurisdiction.93
B. IMPLIED AUTHORIZATION OF NATIONWIDE SERVICE OF PROCESS UNDER SECTION 33 3(B)
OF THE TARIFF ACT
In United States International Trade Commission v. ASAT, Inc.,94 the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit held for the first time that section 333(b) of the Tariff
Act of 1930 (the Tariff Act)9 impliedly authorizes nationwide service of process in actions
to enforce U.S. International Trade Commission (the Commission) subpoenas. The sub-
poena underlying the case was issued to ASAT, Inc.-a non-party-during an investigation
by the Commission under section 337 of the Tariff Act. 6
86. Id. at 832-33.
87. Id. at 833-34.
88. Gen. Contracting & Trading Co. v. Interpole, Inc., 940 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1991).
89. Int'l Transactions, Ltd. v. Embotelladora Agral Regionmontana, 277 ESupp.2d 654 (N.D. Tex. 2002).
90. Dow Chem. Co., 422 E3d at 834.
91. Id. (emphasis in original).
92. In support of its interpretation of Interpole and Embotelladora, the Ninth Circuit also cited two later
decisions of the First Circuit, as well as decisions from the D.C. Circuit and the Fifth Circuit, interpretingthe
cases in a similar manner. See id. at 835 (citing Martel v. Stafford, 992 E2d 1244, 1248 (1st Cir. 1993); Precision
Etchings & Findings, Inc. v. LGP Gem Ltd., 953 E2d 21, 25 (lst Cir. 1992); Rates Tech. Inc. v. Nortel Networks
Corp., 399 E3d 1302, 1308 n. 5 (D.C. Cir. 2005); PaineWebber Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Private Bank (Swit-
zerland), 260 E3d 453, 460 & N. 8 (5th Cir. 2001)).
93. Id. at 835-36.
94. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n v. ASAT, Inc., 411 E3d 245 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
95. 19 U.S.C. § 1333(b) (2000).
96. For details about the investigation, see In Matter of Certain Encapsulated Integrated Circuit Devices &
Products containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-501 (U.S.I.TC.).
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ASAT challenged enforcement of the Commission subpoena on the ground, among oth-
ers, that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction.97 But the D.C. Circuit upheld the
district court's ruling in favor of the Commission. The appeal focused on the question of
whether federal law, and in particular section 333(b) of the Tariff Act, authorizes nationwide
service of process.98 The Tariff Act contains no express language authorizing such service
of process. 9
The D.C. Circuit reached its decision by examining the language of section 333(b). The
court noted that "[o]n two occasions the court has confronted identical or strikingly similar
language in other statutes and concluded that Congress intended to imply nationwide service
of process.""0 Citing to these two prior occasions (one involving the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act' 01 and one involving the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971102), the court
held that "nationwide service of process exists for subpoena enforcement actions under
section 333 (b) of the Tariff Act." 03 In addition to this textual analysis, the court also
supported its holding by reference to the Commission's nationwide jurisdiction to conduct
investigations. According to the court, "it is necessary to imply nationwide service of process
... because there otherwise could be a gap in the Commission's enforcement regime where
no judicial district could enforce a Commission subpoena without the party voluntarily
submitting to the court's jurisdiction. "104
While ASAT argued that the Supreme Court's 1987 decision in Omni CapitalInternational
v. Rudolf Wolff & Co. 10s altered this analysis, the D.C. Circuit disagreed and distinguished
the case on three grounds. First, unlike the instant case and the two prior cases on which
the D.C. Circuit had relied, Omni Capital involved a private cause of action, not agency
enforcement proceedings.- Second, the language of the statute at issue in Omni Capital,
the Commodity Exchange Act, is different from the language of the Tariff Act. Although
the relevant provision in both Acts is silent on the question of service of process, other
provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act expressly address the question of nationwide
service of process with respect to other causes of action, unlike the other provisions of the
Tariff Act. According to the court,
97. In the district court, the Commission also sought enforcement of subpoenas issued to ASAT's parent
(a Hong Kong corporation) and one of the parent's holding companies (a Cayman Island's corporation). The
district court quashed the subpoenas for improper service, and the Commission did not appeal.
98. Rule 4(k)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes extraterritorial service of process con-
sistent with either the long-arm state of the state (or the District of Columbia, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(e)) in which
the district court sits or as otherwise provided by federal law. In this case, the Commission did not contend that
the District of Columbia's long-arm statute authorized service of process on ASAT. Thus, the only question
on appeal was whether federal law authorized such service.
99. Section 333(b) authorizes enforcement of Commission subpoenas by district or territorial courts "within
the jurisdiction of which such inquiry is carried on ...." 19 U.S.C. § 1333(b).
100. ASAT Inc., 411 E3d. at 250-51 (emphasis added).
101. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 49 (2006) (interpreted as implying nationwide service of
process in FTC v. Browning, 435 F.2d 96, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1970)).
102. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. § 437d(b) (2006) (interpreted as implyingnationwide
service of process in FEC v. Committee to Elect Lyndon LaRouche, 613 E2d 859, 862 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
103. ASAT, Inc., 411 E3d at 251.
104. Id. at 252
105. Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97 (1987).
106. ASA, Inc., 411 E3d at 251-52.
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[s]ilence throughout the statute [as in the instant case and the Tariff Act] is weaker evidence
of congressional intent to preclude nationwide service of process than in Omni Capital because
there is no indication that Congress considered and rejected nationwide service of process for
actions under section 333(b) [as it did with private causes of action under the Commodity
Exchange Act].107
Third, while Omni Capital does counsel against implying nationwide service lightly, ex-
press language is unnecessary when it is clear that Congress would have desired nationwide
service of process to effectuate the underlying statute's purpose. 08
m. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act'
A. THE FSIA AND AGENCIES OR INSTRUMENTALITIES OF FOREIGN STATES
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) provides that a foreign state and its agen-
cies and instrumentalities are immune from jurisdiction in United States courts unless cer-
tain exceptions apply. 09 An agency or instrumentality of a foreign state means "any entity-
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and (2) which is an organ of a
foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other own-
ership interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and (3) which is
neither a citizen of a State of the United States ... nor created under the laws of any third
country." 10
In Enaboro v. Abubakar,"' the Seventh Circuit held that an individual who served as
Nigeria's head of state and as a member of a military junta that ruled the country was not
an "agency or instrumentality" of Nigeria because the FSIA "does not apply to individ-
uals.""' The court noted that the FSIA "has been applied to individuals, but in those cases
one thing is clear: the individual must be acting in his official capacity. If he is not, there is
no immunity."" 13 The court held that the former head of state was not entitled to sovereign
immunity under the FSIA for claims of torture and murder, although it found that he was
entitled to "common law immunity for the year that he was head of state."" 4
B. ExcEPTIONS TO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
1. Waiver Erception
The FSIA's exceptions include one for waiver of sovereign immunity. It provides that "a
foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States
or of the States in any case-(l) in which the foreign state has waived its immunity either
107. Id. at 251.
108. Id. Omni Capital's significance decreased in light of the adoption of Rule 4(b)(2) in 1993, a nationwide
long-arm statute for jurisdictional federal question cases.
c. Contributed by John J.P. Howley, a parmer in Kaye Scholer LLP in New York City.
109. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1603(a), 1604 (2005).
110. Id. § 1603(a).
111. Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 E3d 877 (7th Cir. 2005).
112. Id. at 879.
113. Id. at 882.
114. Id. at 879.
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explicitly or by implication, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver which the foreign
state may purport to effect except in accordance with the terms of the waiver.""'
In Calzadilla v. Banco Latino Internacional,116 plaintiff alleged that a Venezuelan govern-
ment agency had implicitly waived sovereign immunity by maliciously prosecuting claims
against the plaintiff in a prior lawsuit in a United States court."7 The Eleventh Circuit
disagreed and affirmed dismissal of the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The
court noted that the implied waiver provision "is narrow and that it generally does not apply
unless the foreign state reveals its intent to waive its immunity by: (1) agreeing to arbitration
in another country, (2) agreeing that the law of a particular country should govern a con-
tract, or (3) filing a responsive pleading in an action without raising the defense of sovereign
immunity.""' Absent one of these specific circumstances, the court held there could be no
implicit waiver.' 19
The court also found the assertion of waiver inconsistent with 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(B),
which expressly excludes "any claim arising out of malicious prosecution" from the excep-
tion to sovereign immunity for noncommercial torts. The court concluded that this lan-
guage would be "superfluous" if a malicious prosecution were found to constitute an implicit
waiver of sovereign immunity. "[I1f a foreign state could implicitly waive its foreign sov-
ereign immunity under the FSIA by maliciously prosecuting a claim in a United States
court against an individual, then there would be no need for the malicious prosecution
exception to the noncommercial tort exemption, which expressly provides that a foreign
state retains its immunity under such a circumstance."' 20
2. Commercial Activity Exception
In Mwani v. Bin Laden,' plaintiffs brought claims against the Government of Afghanistan
for providing logistical support to terrorist organizations that allegedly facilitated the bomb-
ing of the American embassy in Nairobi, Kenya. Although the FSIA contains an exception
to immunity for terrorist activities, that exception applies only where the state in question
has been listed by the U.S. Department of State as "a state sponsor of terrorism."' As
Afghanistan has never been listed as a sponsor of terrorism by the U.S. government, that
exception was not available in this case."' Plaintiffs asserted, instead, the exception to im-
munity for actions "'based ... upon an act outside the territory of the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a
direct effect in the United States. ' 12 4 Plaintiffs asserted that the commercial activity in the
instant case consisted of actively aiding Osama Bin Laden "'by assigning him guards for
security, permitting him to build and maintain terrorist camps, and refusing to cooperate
115. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1).
116. Calzadilla v. Banco Latino Internacional, 413 E3d 1285 (1lth Cir. 2005).
117. Id. at 1288.
118. Id. at 1287.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1288.
121. Mwani v. Bin Laden, 417 3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
122. Id. at 15 n.15 (citing Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 E3d 82, 89 (D.C. Cir.
2002)).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 15 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2)).
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with efforts by the international community to extradite him."" 2 Bin Laden allegedly "'pro-
vided approximately $10-$20 million per year to the Taliban in return for safe haven. ' ' 126
The D.C. Circuit affirmed dismissal of the action against Afghanistan because the alleged
conduct did not constitute "the type of actions by which a private party engages in 'trade
and traffic or commerce."" 27 The court found that "[g]ranting refuge to terrorist training
camps is a uniquely sovereign act; it is not the sort of benefit that a commercial landlord
can bestow upon a commercial tenant."'28 The court also found that the assignment of
security guards and the refusal to extradite Bin Laden were part of the exercise of police
powers and "'cannot be performed by an individual acting in his own name. They can be
performed only by the state acting as such.',9
In BP Chemicals Ltd. v. Jiangsu SOPO Corp.,"10 plaintiff brought an action for misappro-
priation of trade secrets against a number of companies, including Jiangsu SOPO Corpo-
ration ("SOPO"), a Chinese chemical company wholly owned by the Chinese govern-
ment.'3' Plaintiff alleged that its trade secrets, which had been licensed to one of the
defendants, were being used by SOPO to construct a chemical plant in China. Plaintiff
alleged that jurisdiction existed under the commercial activity exception to immunity in the
FSIA for "commercial activity carried on in the United States."" 2
Plaintiff alleged that its claim was based on commercial activity in the United States
because SOPO had used or disclosed its trade secrets in meetings with U.S. vendors who
were fabricating equipment for use in the Chinese chemical plant. " The complaint alleged
that this disclosure occurred in three ways: during direct meetings between SOPO and the
U.S. vendors; in meetings between the U.S. vendors and another company, SPECO, that
allegedly was acting as SOPO's agent; and as part of a civil conspiracy between SOPO and
SPECO.14
The district court held that these allegations, if true, were sufficient to establish the
exception to immunity. Accordingly, it allowed jurisdictional discovery, after which it held
an evidentiary hearing. The district court found that the facts were insufficient to support
the allegation that SPECO was acting as SOPO's agent or to support the conspiracy theory.
The court did agree, however, that "SOPO's own activity within the United States was
sufficient for jurisdiction under the FSIA.""15 This included direct meetings between SOPO
representatives and the U.S. vendors to inspect the equipment and to participate in testing
the equipment."16
On appeal, SOPO argued that although the meetings had occurred, there was no direct
evidence that any trade secrets were disclosed or used during these meetings. The Eighth
Circuit rejected this argument, finding that the disclosure or use of trade secrets at the
125. Id. at 16 (citation omitted).
126. Id. (citation omitted).
127. Mwani, 417 E3d at 16 (citation omitted).
128. Id. at 17.
129. Id. (quoting Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 362 (1993)).
130. BP Chems. Ltd. v. Jiangsu SOPO Corporation, 420 E3d 810 (8th Cir. 2005).
131. Id. at 811-12.
132. Id. at 813 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2)).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 814.
136. BP Cbems. Ltd., 420 F3d at 814.
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meetings could be inferred from the evidence. This included evidence that the specifications
for SOPO's plant in China were "shameless copies" of specifications for plants using plain-
tiff's trade secrets, "in some cases replicating typographical errors made in the specs used
on those projects." ' 7 The court was satisfied that plaintiff's complaint "identifies with par-
ticularity the nature of the trade secrets and confidential information allegedly used," and
that its evidence "specifically identifies multiple instances in which its engineering drawings
were copied and used." 38 "[W]hile the district court did not identify the specific equipment
discussed at each vendor meeting, it is reasonable to infer ... that all the equipment pro-
vided by [the U.S. vendor] was discussed." 39 "It would be odd, indeed, if the Chinese
government required SOPO to attend these meetings and inspections, and then not require
them to inspect all the equipment."' 14
The Eighth Circuit also rejected SOPO's argument that the evidence was insufficient to
establish other elements of plaintiff's claim. At the jurisdictional stage of the case, plaintiff
"need only show that one element of its claim is connected to commercial activity in the
United States."' 4'
In Kirkham v. Societe Air France,142 an American passenger who suffered an injury to her
foot at the airport in Orly, France asserted a negligence claim against Air France. As Air
France is majority owned by the Republic of France, the airline moved to dismiss for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA. Plaintiff responded that jurisdiction existed
under the commercial activity exception in 28 U.S.C. § 1605(2)(a). Curiously, although the
accident occurred in France, the passenger did not assert the exception for commercial
activity "outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity
of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States.' '1 3
Instead, the passenger asserted the exception to sovereign immunity where "the action is
based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state."' 4
The district court agreed and the D.C. Circuit affirmed the denial of Air France's motion
to dismiss. Air France conceded that the ticket sale had occurred in the United States, and
that such a sale constituted commercial activity. It argued, however, that plaintiff's action
was not "based upon" that commercial activity as required by the exception to immunity.
The D.C. Circuit disagreed because the purchase of the ticket was a necessary element of
the passenger's negligence claim. Specifically, the ticket sale formed the basis of the duty
element of the passenger's claim. The D.C. Circuit held that, because "Kirkham must show
she purchased a plane ticket in order to establish a passenger-carrier relationship with the
airline, the ticket sale is necessary to the 'duty of care' element of her negligence claim."'
3. Expropriation Exception
In Peterson v. Royal Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,146 the D.C. Circuit addressed the exception
to sovereign immunity for actions "in which rights in property taken in violation of inter-
137. Id. at 813.
138. Id. at 817.
139. Id. at 818.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 818 n.5.
142. Kirkham v. Societe Air France, No. 04-7209, 2005 WL 3108467 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 22, 2005).
143. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
144. Kirkham, 2005 WL 3108467, at *1 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2)).
145. Id. at *3 (citation omitted).
146. Peterson v. Royal Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 416 E3d 83 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
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national law are in issue and that property or any property exchanged for such property is
present in the United States in connection with commercial activity carried on in the United
States by the foreign state."147 Plaintiff had been employed by a private employer in Saudi
Arabia. By royal decree, the government had established a mandatory retirement program
called the General Organization of Social Insurance ("GOSI"). Under the program, plaintiff
was required to contribute five percent of his income to GOSI, and his employer was
required to contribute an additional eight percent. Upon retirement, GOSI was to pay
plaintiff an annuity based on a formula that considered his income during a period of years
preceding retirement.
After plaintiff and his employer had made several years worth of contributions, the Gov-
ernment of Saudi Arabia changed the GOSI system to exclude non-Saudi workers from the
annuity program. Plaintiff received a refund of the five percent contribution that he had
made into GOSI, but not the eight percent contribution that his employer had made on
his behalf. He brought an action against the government alleging an "arbitrary and dis-
criminatory expropriation of his property in violation of international law."14
The D.C. Circuit refused to find that the "expropriation exception" to the FSIA applied.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3), in order for the exception to apply "at issue must be (1)
'rights in property' that (2) were taken in violation of international law and (3) the property
at issue (or any property exchanged for it) must either (a) be present in the United States
'in connection with a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign
state' or (b) 'owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state and
that agency or instrumentality' engages in commercial activity in the United States." 149
Plaintiff's argument failed at the first hurdle because the court held that he had no "rights
in property" with respect to the eight percent contribution that his employer had made to
GOSI. Distinguishing between a social insurance scheme like GOSI and a personal pension
plan (like a 401(k) plan in the United States), the court found determinative that even if
GOSI had remained in force with respect to foreign workers, the benefit due to plaintiff
would have been unconnected to his (and his employer's) actual contributions but instead
would have been based on a formula corresponding to his average income during a period
of years preceding retirement. On the basis of this distinction the court concluded, plaintiff
"had no right, contractual or otherwise," to his employer's GOSI contributions.""
4. Immovable Property Exception
The FSIA provides an exception to sovereign immunity for actions "in which rights in
property in the United States acquired by succession or gift or rights in immovable property
situated in the United States are in issue."'' In City of New York v. Permanent Mission of
India to the United Nations,"2 the City sought a declaration of validity for tax liens on build-
ings housing the Indian and Mongolian Permanent Missions to the United Nations. 53 The
147. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3).
148. Peterson, 416 E3d at 85.
149. Id. at 86-87 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3)).
150. Id. at 87.
151. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(4).
152. City of New York v. Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations, 376 F. Supp. 2d 429 (S.D.N.Y.
2005).
153. Id. at 430.
SUMMER 2006
290 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
City asserted that jurisdiction existed under the commercial activities exception because
both nations had engaged in commercial activity by housing diplomatic staff in the Mission
buildings, and that jurisdiction also existed under the immovable property exception be-
cause the tax lien constituted a right in immovable property.'14
The district court did not address the commercial activity exception because it found
jurisdiction under the rights in immovable property exception. "' The court held that a tax
lien constitutes a right in immovable property because it "runs with the land" and "directly
affect[s] the property owner's rights to alienate or convey the property."5 6
C. JURISDICTIoNAL DIsCoVERY
In Beecham v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamabiriya,'"7 plaintiffs brought an action
against the Government of Libya seeking damages related to the bombing of a discotheque
in West Berlin. The district court found that the allegations in the complaint and Libya's
denials required "'initial targeted discovery' to resolve subject matter jurisdiction" under
the FSIA.5 s Accordingly, the district court ordered the parties to confer and submit "'a
joint report proposing a plan for conducting discovery limited to facts bearing upon the
court's subject matter jurisdiction.'"'19 Libya sought to appeal from this order and asserted
appellate jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine.160 The D.C. Circuit dismissed the
appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. Finding that the district court's order did not order
any discovery of any scope, but merely required the parties to confer on a joint discovery
plan, the court held that the order appealed from was not a "final decision" because it did
"not by any stretch resolve important issues in the case and [did] not 'conclusively deter-
mine' the scope of jurisdictional discovery."161 Although not raised by Libya, the court also
addressed the possibility of mandamus and found that would not provide a basis for appellate
jurisdiction either. "Only if the court orders jurisdictional discovery and clearly abuses its
discretion in determining the scope of discovery could mandamus possibly lie." 62
Other cases this year have held that jurisdictional discovery is appropriate only when
factual disputes must be resolved to determine the jurisdictional issue. For example, in
Mwani v. Bin Laden,163 the D.C. Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its dis-
cretion by denying jurisdictional discovery against the Government of Afghanistan because
"even assuming that the Taliban engaged in all of the conduct alleged in the complaint, the
commercial activity exception would not apply.",-
154. Id.
155. Id. at 432 & n.4.
156. Id. at 436.
157. Beecham v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 424 F3d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
158. Id. at 1110-11.
159. Id. at 1111.
160. Id. (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949)).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1112.
163. Mwani, 417 F.3d at 1.
164. Id. at 17.
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IV. The Act of State Doctrined
A. INTRODUCTION
The act of state doctrine bars U.S. courts from judging the validity of acts by a "recog-
nized foreign sovereign power committed within its own territory."' 65 The policies of in-
ternational comity, respect for the sovereignty of foreign nations on their own territory,
and concerns for the domestic separation of powers underlie the doctrine,'66 which is solely
a prudential limitation and is neither jurisdictional nor constitutionally mandated.167
The act of state doctrine only applies in actions where the relief sought or defense in-
terposed would require a U.S. court to declare a foreign sovereign's official act invalid. The
doctrine's operation leaves such challenges exclusively to the political branches of the U.S.
government. 68 In analyzing act of state doctrine issues, courts consider a three-factor frame-
work announced by the Supreme Court in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino. The three
factors include (1) the degree of consensus on a given area of international law; (2) the
dispute's foreign relations implications to the U.S. government; and (3) if "the government
which perpetrated the challenged act of state is no longer in existence."169 Some courts also
ask "whether the foreign state was acting in the public interest.""70
The act of state doctrine is a binding rule of decision, rather than a doctrine of absten-
tion.' Once invoked, it requires U.S. courts to deem valid the acts of foreign sovereigns
committed within those sovereigns' own boundaries.' The doctrine provides foreign states
with a substantive defense on the merits. An act of state defense thus differs from a claim
of sovereign immunity, which raises only a jurisdictional defense.' The burden of proving
that the act of state doctrine applies rests with the party attempting to invoke it as a basis
for dismissing the action." 4
B. JUDICIAL DETERMINATIONS As ACTS OF STATE
In Philippine National Bank v. United States District Court, part of a long-running dispute
over the assets of former Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos's estate, the Ninth
Circuit held that the act of state doctrine prevents a district court from declaring a foreign
court's forfeiture judgment invalid."' The case arose from a dispute between class plaintiffs,
who had won a judgment against the estate's assets for human rights violations, and the
Philippine government, which claimed rights to the assets under the theory that Marcos
had stolen them from the Republic and its people. Some of the disputed assets resided in
Swiss banks. On a request from the Philippine government, the Swiss government first
d. Contributed by Emma Prete, Associate, Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, New York, New York.
165. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964).
166. Id. at 428.
167. Doe v. Qi, 349 E Supp. 2d 1258 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
168. See WS. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int'l, 493 U.S. 400, 404 (1990).
169. Id. at 427-28.
170. Qi, 349 F Supp. 2d at 1290.
171. See WS. Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 406.
172. See id.; see also World Wide Minerals, Ltd. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, 296 F3d 1154 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
173. See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 700 (2004).
174. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 691 (1976).
175. Philippine Nat'l Bank v. United States Dist. Ct., 397 E3d 768 (9th Cir. 2005).
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froze the assets and later transferred them to the Singapore branch of the Philippine Na-
tional Bank, to be held in escrow pending a determination of rightful ownership by a
competent Philippine court. The Philippine Supreme Court later declared that the assets
had been forfeited to the Republic of the Philippines.
In the first instance, the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii then held
that the Philippine forfeiture judgment was invalid, finding that the court had "violated
'due process by any standard.'176 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the
act of state doctrine encompassed more than just legislative or executive acts. Because "[tlhe
forfeiture action was not a mere dispute between private parties" but "an action initiated
by the Philippine government pursuant to its 'statutory mandate to recover property alleg-
edly stolen from the treasury,"' the Republic's actions qualified as governmental and the
act of state doctrine barred the district court from considering the underlying subject mat-
ter.'77 According to the Ninth Circuit, the district court had exceeded its authority by
examining the validity of the Philippine forfeiture judgment, which qualified as an act of
state.
The class plaintiffs also argued the act of state doctrine should not apply because the
disputed assets were not present within the territory of the Philippines. According to the
Ninth Circuit, however, "[tihe [act of state] doctrine is to be applied pragmatically and
flexibly, with reference to its underlying considerations."'' The Ninth Circuit stated that,
even assuming that the assets were located outside the Philippines, the factors underlying
the act of state doctrine were still relevant, given the "extraordinary circumstances of [the]
case," where both the Swiss and Philippine governments had agreed the assets should be
held in Singapore, pending determination of their ownership by a Philippine court. 17 9
C. ALLEGED JUs COGENS VIOLATIONS
In 2005, a district court ruled that the act of state doctrine prevented it from considering
Palestinian plaintiffs' claims that Israeli government defendants had committed various torts
against them by supporting the establishment of Israeli settlements in the West Bank."80
The court first stated that the case revolved around the second Sabbatino factor of potential
interference with the United States' foreign relations. It then went on to label the alleged
Israeli government actions as classic acts of state and found that any judgment on the validity
of Israel's actions with regard to the occupation by its citizens of land arguably within its
own territory would create a clear danger to amicable relations between Israel and the
United States."8' In reaching this decision, the court found that the first Sabbatino factor-
the degree of consensus on a particular area of international law-was unsettled because
"the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has sharply divided the world."" 2 According to the court,
the fact that the plaintiffs' complaint included allegations ofjus cogens violations did not
176. Id. at 771.
177. Id. at 773.
178. Id. at 773 (quoting Tchacosh Co. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 776 F2d 1333, 1337 (9th Cir. 1985)).
179. Id. at 773-74.
180. Doe v. State of Israel, 400 E Supp. 2d 86 (D.D.C. 2005) (mem).
181. Id. at 114.
182. Id. at 113.
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swing the calculus in their favor, since adjudicating the dispute would unavoidably cause
serious interference with the United States' foreign policy in the Middle East.
8 3
In another case, Abiola v. Gen. Abdusalami Abubakar, however, a district court for the
Northern District of Illinois found that the act of state doctrine did not apply where the
plaintiffs alleged jus cogens violations against General Abdusalami Abubakar, a member of
the ruling military regime in Nigeria from 1993 to 1999.' 84 In analyzing the Sabbatino
factors, the court gave heavy weight to the severity of the human rights violations that the
plaintiffs alleged.' s In addition, the fact that the defendant's military regime had since been
replaced by a democratically elected government also weighed in the plaintiffs' favor, since
the change of regime largely removed the possibility of diplomatic tension between the
United States and Nigeria should the court consider the plaintiffs' claims against Abu-
bakarY16 The District Court for the District of Columbia mirrored this reasoning in Owens
v. Repbulic of Sudan, in refusing to dismiss a claim brought against Sudanese defendants by
plaintiffs injured in terrorist attacks on U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and
Nairobi, Kenya.1 7 The court noted that few acts "more clearly violate international law
than a terrorist attack on innocent civilians." ss
The severity of the violations alleged also tipped the balance in the plaintiffs' favor in
Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., a case that arose after the Columbian Air Force, acting
in cooperation with a private oil company, bombed and raided a village in an attempt to
further the oil company's security interests.Y9 The court found that the act of state doctrine
did not apply, largely because of the severity of the claimed violationsY ° The court noted
that "[s]ince the alleged actions of Defendant violated binding international law norms, [we]
cannot conclude Colombia was acting pursuant to the public interest."' 9' The severity of
the conduct alleged thus also influenced the court's treatment of the sometimes-considered
fourth factor of whether the foreign government was acting in the public interest. Never-
theless, despite finding that the act of state doctrine did not bar further litigation, the court
went on to dismiss the case because it raised a non-justiciable political questionY2
D. OTHER CASES
In Glen v. Club Mediterranee S.A., a case involving real property claims against a Cuban
resort for trespass and unjust enrichment, a district court reiterated that the act of state
183. Id. at 60.
184. Abiola v. Gen. Abdusalami Abubakar, No. 02 C 6093, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27831 (N.D. 111. Nov. 8,
2005).
185. Id. at *5.
186. Id. at *6.
187. Owens v. Repbulic of Sudan, 374 F Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2005).
188. Id. at 27. In conducting its analysis, the court also explained that the potential for interference with the
diplomatic work of other government branches is reduced in this context, since the executive branch had already
designated the state at issue as a state sponsor of terrorism under the relevant provision of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7). Id. The court does, however, seem to misunderstand the second factor
of regime change, indicating that a regime change would tip the balance in favor of applying the act of state
doctrine to bar further review when a regime change would normally make a court less hesitant to bar review
of the former government's actions. Id. ("This case does not present a circumstance in which a change of
government-in Iran or Sudan-warrants application of the act of state doctrine.").
189. Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 . Supp. 2d 1164 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
190. Id. at 1190.
191. Id. at 1191.
192. Id. at 1195.
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doctrine bars claims even between private litigants if such claims would require the court
to examine the validity of a foreign government's official act.' 9" The plaintiffs' claim rested
on their assertion that they still rightfully owned property expropriated by the Cuban gov-
ernment in 1959.194 The court held that the act of state doctrine barred it from considering
the plaintiffs' claim against the private hotel because "[t]he doctrine does not simply relieve
the foreign government of liability for its acts, but operates as an issue preclusive device,
foreclosing judicial inquiry into the validity or propriety of such acts in litigation between
any set of parties."' 95 Because deciding the case would necessarily require the court to
examine the validity of the Cuban government's 1959 seizure of the plaintiffs' property, the
act of state doctrine required dismissal.
196
Also this year, a California district court held in Cruz v. United States that the act of state
doctrine did not bar consideration of whether Mexican state-owned bank defendants im-
properly refused to disgorge funds claimed by plaintiffs.' 9 The same court in Dugong v.
Rumsfeld denied summary judgment for the defendants, the Secretary and Department of
Defense, because the facts were not fully developed enough to tell whether the relevant
foreign government, here Japan, or the U.S. government had committed the acts on which
the plaintiffs' complaint was based. 98
V. International Discovery-
A. OBTAINING U.S. DISCOVERY FOR USE IN FOREIGN PROCEEDINGS
In 2005, there were a number of cases applying 28 U.S.C. § 1782, which provides that
the district court "in which a person resides or is found may order him to give his testimony
or statement ... or other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tri-
bunal." 99 The court in Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Cbubb Inurance. Co. of Canada200 was asked
by a party to litigation in Canada to order the production of documents from a U.S. non-
party, BP America. The documents being sought were not located in the United States,
but rather in Canada, in the possession of BP America's foreign parent corporation. 20' The
court noted that the issue of whether § 1782 may be used to obtain documents located
abroad had been previously addressed by courts in dicta, but that the question was otherwise
one of first impression. It concluded that § 1782 does not authorize the production of
193. Glen v. Club Mediterranee S.A., 365 E Supp. 2d. 1263 (S.D. Fla. 2005).
194. Id. at 1267.
195. Id. at 1271.
196. See id.
197. Cruz v. United States, 387 F Supp. 2d 1057 (N.D. Cal. 2005). Citing Alfred Dunhill v. Republic of
Cuba, 485 U.S. 682 (1976), the court resolved the act of state issue against defendants because the Mexico had
not formally repudiated its obligation to repay the money in the plaintiffs' savings funds. According to the
court, an act of some kind, even an act signifying the intent to not act, is required. "[Mlere failure to pay,
without having admitted an obligation and then formally repudiated it, [is] insufficient to support a finding
that the nonpayment was invested with the sovereign authority of the state." Id. at 1069.
198. Dugong v. Rumsfeld, No. C 03-4350, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3123, at *65-66 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2005).
e. Contributed by Glenn P. Hendrix, Partner, Arnall Golden Gregory LLP, Adanta, Georgia.
199. 28 U.S.C. §1782 (2006).
200. Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Chubb Ins. Co. of Canada, 384 E Supp. 2d 45 (D.D.C. 2005).
201. Id. at 46.
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documents located outside the United States and that a contrary interpretation "would not
be in keeping with the aims of the statute." 0 2
In In re Application of Imanagement Services Ltd.,20 3 the Bank of New York (BNY) sought
to vacate a section 1782 order directing that it provide discovery in support of an action
pending in Russia. The Russian court had refused to stay its proceedings pending the
discovery on the ground that under Russian civil procedure, "a transcript of witness testi-
mony obtained without an order from the Russian court may not 'serve as due evidence."',04
In opposing the discovery, BNY cited the 2004 ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court in Intel
Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.,205 which held that in considering a § 1782 request, the
U.S. court should consider "the receptivity of the foreign government or the court or agency
abroad to U.S. federal -court judicial assistance." The district court read this instruction
narrowly. Citing pre-Intel Second Circuit precedent,'- the court stated that its "'inquiry
into the discoverability of requested materials should consider only authoritative proof that
a foreign tribunal would reject evidence obtained with the aid of § 1782.' ' 207 The court
declined to find such authoritative proof in the record, observing that "BNY does not assert
that the Russian court has asked this Court to deny [the] discovery request or otherwise
explicitly signaled its general lack of receptivity to outside discovery assistance. '"208 The court
noted further that even if the transcript resulting from the deposition in the United States
was itself inadmissible in Russia, there was no "indication, let alone authoritative proof, that
the Russian court would reject as evidence documents gathered with the aid of the witnesses'
deposition testimony." 09
In re Application of HilPl" involved a § 1782 order in support of a liquidation proceeding
in Hong Kong. The target of the discovery request, Ernst & Young (E&Y), argued that
the Hong Kong case was not a proceeding in which an adjudicative function was being
exercised and was therefore beyond the scope of § 1782. The court held that if the pro-
ceeding served merely to enforce prior judgments, it would not have qualified as adjudi-
cative,"' but observed that the Hong Kong proceeding would involve the resolution of
competing creditors' claims and a determination of the value of the debtors' estates, thereby
satisfying the adjudicative function requirement. The court also rejected an argument by
E&Y that the request should be denied on the ground that the requested discovery was not
for use in the Hong Kong proceeding. In that regard, E&Y contended that the liquidators
were "brazenly trawling for information to determine whether any claims [against third
parties] exist," that such claims must be asserted in separate proceedings, and that the
discovery would be for use in those proceedings as opposed to the Hong Kong liquidation
proceeding." 2 The court nevertheless allowed the discovery, holding that the "fact that the
Liquidators may use the fruits of discovery to pursue potential claims against third parties
202. Id. at 55.
203. In re Imanagement Servs. Ltd., No. Misc. 05-89(FB) 2005 WL 1959702 (E.D.N.Y Aug. 16, 2005).
204. Id. at *1.
205. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004).
206. In re Application of Euromepa, 154 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 1998).
207. Imanagement Services, 2005 WL 1959702, at *4 (quoting Euromepa, 51 F.3d at 1100).
208. Id. at *4.
209. Id.
210. In re Hill, No. M19-117 (RJH), 2005 WL 1330769 (S.D.N.Y.June 3, 2005).
211. The court cited Euromepa, 154 E3d at 28, for this proposition.
212. Hill, 2005 WL 1330769 at *4
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does not undermine their equally legitimate goals" of using the information in the liqui-
dation proceeding.'"
B. OBTAINING DISCOVERY FROM ABROAD FOR USE IN U.S. PROCEEDINGs-DOCUMENTS
Document discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may be obtained from
a foreign non-party if the non-party is subject to the personal jurisdiction of the U.S. court.
To date, most federal courts apply the same standards in evaluating the existence of personal
jurisdiction with respect to both defendants and non-party witnesses.1 4 In the case of In re
Automotive Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litigation,"' the court considered whether it should
examine the foreign non-party's contacts with the United States as a whole, using a national
contacts test, or only with the forum from which the subpoena issued, the District of Co-
lumbia. Citing authority from the First, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits1 6 in the
context of assessing jurisdiction over a defendant, the court held that since the action arose
under federal law (the Clayton Act), the relevant forum for assessing a non-party witness'
contacts was the United States as a whole.
The court in Estate of Unger v. Palestinian Authority 7 applied a similar analysis, but in a
more restrictive manner. The proponent of the request had obtained a judgment under the
federal Antiterrorism Act (ATA) against the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Palestine
Liberation Organization. It subpoenaed a non-party Egyptian telecommunications com-
pany (Orascom) in an effort to obtain discovery regarding Orascom's debt to the PA's
investment fund. The court held that even in a federal question case, a national contacts
test would be applied only if the applicable federal statute provides for national service of
process. 18 The court noted that the ATA permits national service of process, but rejected
the judgment creditor's argument that the ATA's jurisdictional reach applied to ancillary
enforcement proceedings as well.2' 9 The court also rejected the creditor's argument that
personal jurisdiction attached under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2), which permits service of a
summons "with respect to claims arising under federal law" on the ground that this "statute
limits its reach to defendants" and simply does not apply to third-party subpoenas.2 0 Thus,
the court considered only Orascom's contacts with New York.
C. OBTAINING DISCOVERY FROM ABROAD FOR USE IN U.S. PROCEEDINGS -TESTIMONY
In Minebea Co. v. Papst,2' the court ordered the defendant in a patent license dispute
(Papst) to produce certain German witnesses at the trial of the case in the United States.
The witnesses, who were the inventors under the patent, were not subject to the personal
jurisdiction of the court and were not officers, directors, or managing agents of Papst.22
213. Id.
214. See Note, Ryan W Scott, Minimum Contacts, No Dog: Evaluating Personal Jurisdiction for Nonparty Dis-
covery, 88 MuNN. L. Rav. 968 (2004).
215. In re Automotive Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 229 ER.D. 482 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
216. Id.
217. Ungar v. Palestinian Authority, 400 F. Supp. 2d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
218. Id. at 547.
219. Id. at 548.
220. Id. at 552 (emphasis in original).
221. Minebea Co. v. Papst, 370 E Supp. 2d 302 (D.D.C. 2005).
222. Id. at 306-07.
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Nevertheless, each had executed patent assignment agreements, which included commit-
ments to provide testimony at Papst's request. Papst argued that this provision was intended
to benefit only Papst itself and did not create a benefit by which a third party could demand
testimony from the inventors.223 The court disagreed, interpreting the clause to mean that
the inventors agreed to testify in any legal proceedings, not just those in which Papst would
like them to testify.22 4 The court directed that if Papst failed to produce the witnesses for
testimony at trial, it would instruct the jury as to adverse inferences to be drawn from their
absence.225
VI. Choice of Law'
A. CHOICE OF LAw AND CONTRACTUAL SET-OFF RIGHTS
In Finance One Public Co. v. Lehman Brothers Special Financing, Inc., the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's determination that Thai law governed extra-
contractual set-off disputes, but ultimately reversed the district court's application of Thai
law.226 The case involved a standard Master Agreement published by the International Swaps
and Derivatives Association, which contained a choice-of-law clause directing the parties
to specific governing law in the Schedule to the Master Agreement and a forum selection
clause requiring the parties to submit to the jurisdiction of either English or New York
courts.227
In this diversity action, the Second Circuit applied the forum state's (New York) choice-
of-law rules. The threshold validity of the choice-of-law clause was assumed, but the parties
disputed its scope, which the court also addressed as a threshold issue under the forum
state's law.22 Applying a substantive choice of law analysis, the Second Circuit held that
the choice-of-law clause, interpreted under New York law, was not broad enough to en-
compass the extra-contractual set-off rights at issue.2 9 The court noted that New York
courts are reluctant to read choice-of-law clauses broadly and that the parties could have
included a provision creating set-off rights within their agreement.230 Because the court
held that the set-off issue was not within the scope of the choice-of-law clause of the Master
Agreement, it applied New York's interest analysis to determine what law applied to the
set-off issue. Concluding that the contacts with Thailand were stronger than the contacts
with New York, the court affirmed the district court's ruling that Thai law applied to the
set-off claim.23l Applying Thai law, however, the Second Circuit reached a different sub-
stantive result than the lower court and reversed the judgment and remanded for entry of
judgment for defendant.232
223. Id. at 307.
224. Id. at 308-09.
225. Id. at 310.
f. Contributed by Meshach Y. Rhoades and Barry C. Bartel, Associates, Holland & Hart LLP, Denver,
Colorado.
226. Finance One Pub. Co. v. Lehman Bros. Special Fin., 414 E3d 325 (2d Cir. 2005).
227. Id. at 327-28
228. Id. at 333.
229. Id. at 335-36.
230. Id. at 337.
231. Id. at 337-28.
232. Finance One Pub. Co., 414 F3d at 340-45.
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B. CHOICE OF LAW AND COPYRIGHT
In Films By Jove, Inc. v. Berov, the Eastern District of New York held that it would not
defer to a post-judgment Russian ministerial directive, which retroactively expropriated the
ownership and property of an American company's copyright license. " In 1992, the parties
entered into an exclusive copyright license for worldwide distribution outside of the former
Soviet Union.3 4 In response to a 1998 action for copyright infringement brought by Films
By Jove, the defendant disputed the validity of the licensing agreement based on claims
regarding ownership of the licensing rights. 2" Thereafter, the Russian Federation issued a
ministerial directive effectively divesting Films By Jove of its copyright property rights.
236
The court determined that the Russian directive was invalid because it constituted a direct
attempt to confiscate, without compensation, a U.S. company's property rights in the
United States.2" In effect, the court invalidated the Russian directive because it amounted
to a taking of U.S. property and an attempt to overturn an existing Russian copyright to
effect that taking.
The court rejected the defendant's argument that the act of state doctrine precludes the
United States courts from inquiring into the validity of the Russian directive.23 In so hold-
ing, the court established that the act of state doctrine, which normally precludes U.S.
courts from inquiring into the validity of the public acts of a recognized foreign sovereign
power committed within its own territory, does not extend to takings of property located
outside of the foreign sovereign's territory at the time of the taking. 3 9 The court determined
that Films By Jove's licensing rights were located in the United States, as this was where
the rights were to be distributed, as well as where Films By Jove was domiciled.
Further, the court held that although comity is applied more broadly than the act of state
doctrine, it could not be applied in contravention of public policy principles. 40 Finally, the
court held that its ruling did not contradict the Berne Convention's principle of national
treatment, which essentially grants a foreign copyright holder the same protections in U.S.
courts as an U.S. copyright holder.214
C. CHOICE OF LAW AND FOREIGN PRIVILEGE
In In re Philip Services Corp. Securities Litigation, the Southern District of New York further
limited the use of foreign privilege law when it held that courts examining communications
involving foreign attorneys, or occurring in foreign countries, must apply the law of the
country that has the predominant or "most direct and compelling interest" in the com-
munications and maintenance of their confidentiality.1
2
233. Films ByJove, Inc. v. Berov, 341 F Supp.2d 199 (E.D.N.Y 2004). This case is the third in a series of
cases. See 154 F Supp.2d 432 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) and 250 E Supp.2d 156 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
234. Id. at 200-01.
235. Id. at 201.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 214.
238. Id. at 206-07.
239. Films By Jove, 341 F Supp.2d at 207.
240. Id. at 212-13.
241. In fact, in a significant number of cases, the country of infringement was also the country where the
action for infringement was brought.
242. In re Philip Servs. Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 98CIV0835 MBM DF, 2005 WL 2482494 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7,
2005).
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The court in Philip Services determined that where attorney-client communications take
place in a foreign country, the court should use a "comity or 'touching base' approach" to
resolve which country's law applies.21 3 Communications touching base with the United
States will be governed by federal discovery rules, while applicable foreign law will govern
communications related to matters solely involving a foreign country.2- The dispute in-
volved attorney opinion letters authored by a Canadian law firm and several U.S. attorneys,
concerning a planned public offering of securities in the United States.4s The letters were
shared with an independent auditor and subsequently produced in response to a discovery
request. Despite the argument that Canadian privilege law applied to these documents, the
court held that the opinion letters sufficiently touched base with the United States because
the letters were not only authored by both U.S. and Canadian attorneys, but also rendered
legal advice concerning a public offering of securities in the United States.2"4 The court
granted the motion for an order compelling a non-party and defendant to testify concerning
certain attorney opinion letters that were claimed to be privileged.
247
VII. Extraterritorial Application of United States Laws
A. INTRODUCTION
The principles set forth in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations concerns the
extraterritorial application of U.S. law that permits a state to exercise prescriptive jurisdic-
tion where the conduct in question "has or is intended to have substantial effect within its
territory."24 A court seeking to apply a given U.S. law extraterritorially must consider the
following factors: (1) the extent of the domestic effect of the conduct; (2) the connections
between the United States and the persons engaging in the conduct in question; (3) the
character of the conduct and the extent to which it is regulated elsewhere; (4) the degree
to which justified expectations would be affected; (5) the importance of the regulation
internationally; (6) consistency with international custom; (7) the extent of another state's
interests; and (8) whether extraterritorial application would create a conflict with the laws
of a foreign jurisdiction. 49
In the past year, U.S. courts have applied these principles in a wide variety of fields. court
decisions have considered extraterritoriality in disputes involving the federal habeas corpus
statute, as well as intellectual property, antitrust, securities, employment, disabilities, tort
claims, criminal law, and immigration issues.
243. Id. at *1 (quoting Astra Aktiebolag v. Andrx Pharms., 208 ER.D. 92, 98 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)).
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at *2.
247. Id. at *2-3.
g. Contributed by Vincent Chirico, Associate, Silverman Sclar Shin & Byrne, PLLC; Adjunct Professor of
Legal Writing and Reasoning, Appellate Advocacy and Persuasion, New York Law School. Zena L. Spektor
assisted in the preparation of this article, for which the author is grateful.
248. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS §§ 402-403 (1987).
249. Id.
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B. PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS STATUTE
In last year's review,250 we considered the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Rasul v. Bush,25 which held that detainees at the U.S. base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, were
entitled to seek federal habeas relief. In a 5 to 4 decision, the majority found that the
ordinary presumption that Congressional legislation does not have extraterritorial appli-
cation unless such intent is clearly manifested did not apply in the application of the habeas
statute to persons detained at Guantanamo Bay because such persons were within the ter-
ritorial jurisdiction of the United States, whether citizens or not.2 In Rasu's wake, nu-
merous habeas petitions were filed on behalf of various Guantanamo Bay detainees, leading
to conflicting decisions.
In Khalid v. Bush,253 District Judge Richard J. Leon of the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia held that there was no viable legal theory under which a federal
court could issue a writ of habeas corpus challenging the legality of the detention of non-
resident aliens detained outside of the territorial sovereignty of the United States. The
court found that in Rasul, the Supreme Court had limited its inquiry merely to whether
federal courts had subject matter jurisdiction to review challenges to detention in Guan-
tanamo Bay under the habeas statute, and did not address the issue of whether detainees
actually had any substantive constitutional rights. Recognizing that none of the detainees
had any connection to the United States, Judge Leon held that the detainees had no right
to challenge the President's political authority under either the Constitution or the Sep-
tember 18, 2001 Congressional Authorization of Use of Military Force, issued in response
to the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
Twelve days later, Judge Joyce Hens Green of the same court held that eleven enemy
combatants stated valid constitutional claims under the Due Process clause of the Fifth
Amendment, and that at least some also stated valid claims under the Third Geneva Con-
vention.5 4 In In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases,25 Judge Green held that subjecting detainees
to indefinite detention violated the petitioners' due process rights under the Fifth Amend-
ment. The court reasoned that
there can be no question that the Fifth Amendment right asserted by the Guantanamo detainees
in this litigation-the right not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law-is one
of the most fundamental rights recognized by the U.S. Constitution. In light of the Supreme
Court's decision in Rasul, it is clear that Guantanamo Bay must be considered the equivalent
of a U.S. territory in which fundamental constitutional rights apply. Accordingly... respon-
dents' contention that the Guantanamo detainees have no constitutional rights is rejected
256
The government has appealed Judge Green's decision and, as of this writing, its resolution
is pending.
250. Vincent Chirico, ErtraterritorialApplication of United States Law, 38 INT'L LAw. 347, 348 (2004).
251. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
252. Id. at 481.
253. Khalid v. Bush, 355 E Supp.2d 311, 314 (D.D.C. 2005).
254. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443 (D.D.C. 2005).
255. Id.
256. Id. at 464 (emphasis in original).
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C. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
In McBee v. Delica Co. 257 the First Circuit addressed the issue of when extraterritorial
application of the Lanham Act is proper. Plaintiff, a well-known American jazz musician,
sued Delica, a Japanese company, for false endorsement and dilution under the Lanham
Act, after Delica had adopted the name "Cecil McBee" for its adolescent female clothing
line. In this case of first impression, the First Circuit declined to follow precedent from the
Second and Ninth Circuits. Specifically, the court refused to follow the Second Circuit's
Vanity Fair test, which requires courts to determine whether (1) the defendant is an Amer-
ican citizen, (2) the defendant's actions have a substantial effect on United States commerce,
and (3) relief would create a conflict with foreign law.25s Rather, the McBee court held that
the inquiry should only determine the first two issues." 9 According to the First Circuit, the
third issue, principles of comity (i.e., whether relief under the Lanham Act would create a
conflict with foreign law), should only be considered once a court has determined that
subject matter jurisdiction under the Lanham Act exists.
D. CRIMINAL STATUTES
The Supreme Court recently held that Canadian individuals who carried out a scheme
in New York and Maryland to smuggle large quantities of liquor into Canada in order to
evade Canadian alcohol import taxes were properly convicted of violating the federal wire
fraud statute. In Pasquantino v. United States'6° Justice Thomas, in a 5 to 4 decision, found
that the common law revenue rule, which bars a U.S. court from enforcing a foreign sov-
ereign's tax laws, did not preclude this prosecution because any resulting enforcement of
the Canadian revenue law was merely a collateral consequence of the government's inde-
pendent interest in punishing domestic criminal conduct.
In dissent, Justice Ginsburg stated that the majority opinion "ascribed an exorbitant scope
to the wire fraud statute, in disregard of our repeated recognition that 'Congress legislates
against the backdrop of the presumption against extraterritoriality.'-' 61 The dissent also
noted that "tax collection internationally is an area in which treaties hold sway," and that
the majority's novel decision failed to "take account of Canada's primary interest ... [in]
decid[ing] 'whether, and to what extent, the defendants have defrauded the governments of
Canada and Ontario out of tax revenues owed pursuant to their own, sovereign, excise
laws.' "262
The court's decision in Pasquantino had an immediate effect on a case considered in the
2003 review,263 European Community v. RJR Nabisco, Inc.264 In European Community, the Sec-
ond Circuit had held that the legislative history of the Patriot Act did not abrogate the
common law revenue rule and that, accordingly, the European Community and several
257. McBee v. Delica Co., 417 E3d 107 (1st Cit. 2005).
258. Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 E2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956).
259. McBee, 417 F3d at 111.
260. Pasquantino v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1766 (2005).
261. Id. at 1782 (citing EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)).
262. Id. at 1782-83 (citing Attorney General of Canada v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 336 F3d
321, 343 (4th Cir. 2003)).
263. Chirico, supra note 251, at 347.
264. European Community v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 355 E3d 123 (2d Cir. 2004).
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other sovereign plaintiffs could not use the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act (RICO) to recover lost tax revenue resulting from alleged cigarette smuggling
and money laundering in their territories by several tobacco companies. In light of Pas-
quantino, however, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded European Community for fur-
ther consideration.2 6s On remand, the Second Circuit held fast to its original decision,
distinguishing Pasquantino as a situation where the link between the prosecution and foreign
tax collection was "incidental and attenuated at best."26 In European Community, by contrast,
the Second Circuit held, "the 'whole object' of the present suit is to collect tax revenue and
the costs associated with its collection."267 Accordingly, the common law revenue rule con-
tinued to preclude the claims at issue regardless of Pasquantino.
In another decision involving the extraterritorial application of criminal law, the Fifth
Circuit considered, for the first time, whether 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii) could support a
conviction for conspiring to smuggle undocumented aliens into the United States for com-
mercial gain. In United States v. Villanueva,268 the court affirmed the defendants' convictions
for conspiracy, holding that Congress explicitly intended to apply the statute extraterrito-
rially. The court based its interpretation of the statute on several grounds:. First, the 1986
Immigration Reform and Control Act changed the statute's phrase "'brings into' to 'brings
to' in order to 'deter potential transporters from inundating U.S. Ports of entry with un-
documented aliens. '' 26 9 Second, the statute criminalizes not only the act of smuggling un-
documented aliens into the United States, but also criminalizes attempts to bring undoc-
umented aliens into the United States. Third, immigration statutes by their very nature
intend to regulate conduct occurring near international borders, with some activity taking
place on the foreign side of those borders.270
E. ANTITRUST
In last year's review,27' we considered F Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 272
wherein the Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, held that the Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvements Act and comity principles supported a finding that the Sherman Act would
not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce with foreign nations unless the conduct
affects trade or commerce in the United States in a reasonably foreseeable, direct, and
substantial manner. In that case, foreign companies who purchased vitamin products outside
the United States claimed price-fixing in violation of the Sherman Act.
After remand, the District of Columbia Circuit held that the maintenance of super-
competitive prices in the United States by foreign manufacturers, which may have facilitated
a scheme to charge comparable prices abroad, did not give rise to extraterritorial application
of the Sherman Act because the claimants did not establish that increased domestic prices
265. European Community v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 125 S. Ct. 1968 (2005).
266. Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct. at 1766.
267. European Community v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 424 F.3d 175, 181 (2005).
268. United States v. Villanueva, 408 E3d 193 (5th Cir. 2005).
269. Id. at 198 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 682(I), 99th Cong. 2d Sess. 65-66 (1986)).
270. Id. at 199.
271. Chirico, supra, note 251.
272. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004).
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proximately caused those foreign injuries and no direct ties to United States commerce
were identified.27 The foreign manufacturers have filed a writ of certiorari . 4
F. LABOR STANDARDS
The District of Columbia Circuit recently held that Title VII does not apply to a United
States permanent resident alien employed outside the United States. In Shekoyan v. Sibley
International,27 the plaintiff, an economist, had immigrated to the United States from Ar-
menia in 1994 and was granted permanent resident alien status in 1996. Sibely hired him
as a training advisor on an accounting reform project conducted in the Republic of Georgia.
The contract listed the plaintiff's place of employment as Tbilisi, Georgia. After his con-
tract was not renewed, the plaintiff brought suit, alleging employment discrimination based
on national origin. The District Court dismissed the complaint, finding that since the
plaintiff was a permanent resident alien employed extraterritorially, he was outside the scope
of Title VII's protections.276
On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit noted that Congress had amended Title VII
in order to include protections to U.S. citizens employed abroad. The plaintiff argued that
his permanent resident alien status made him a "U.S. national, thereby placing him in
statutory limbo between a protected citizen and an excluded alien."277 The court disagreed.
Title VII does more than merely exclude an alien employed overseas from protection: it affir-
matively grants protection only to 'a citizen of the United States.' Especially in light of the
presumption against extraterritoriality, the Congress's express language extending the extra-
territorial reach of Tide VII only to American citizens controls.28
Similarly, in Ofori-Tenkorang v. American International Group,27 9 the Southern District of
New York dismissed discrimination and retaliation claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 brought
by a permanent resident alien assigned to work temporarily in South Africa. 280
273. Empagran v. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., 417 E3d 1267, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
274. Empagran v. E Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., 417 E3d 1267, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2005), petition for cert. filed,
74 U.S.L.W 3288 (Oct 26, 2005) (No 05-541).
275. Shekoyan v. Sibley Int'l, 409 E3d 414 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
276. Shekoyan v. Sibley Int'l Corp., 217 E Supp.2d 59 (D.D.C. 2002).
277. Shekoyan, 409 F3d at 421.
278. Id.
279. Ofori-Tenkorang v. Am. Int'l Group, Inc., No. 05 Civ.2921 DLC, 2005 WL 2280211 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
280. The court held that
[t]he language of Section 1981 does not indicate a congressional purpose to extend coverage beyond
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. On the contrary, it affirmatively reinforces its domestic
application where it states that it applies to "[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States"
with the goal of securing equal rights "in every State and Territory."
Id. at 14.
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VIII. Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
and Judgmentsh
A. INTRODUCTION
Recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards and foreign court judgments are
governed by two separate regimes in United States courts. The Convention on the Rec-
ognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral'Awards, signed in New York on June 10,
1958 (New York Convention) normally governs the recognition and enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards. 81 State law, on the other hand, governs the enforcement of foreign judg-
ments. In the event that no statute governs the enforcement of judgments in a particular
state, courts often apply the comity-based common law principles set forth in the Supreme
Court's decision in Hilton v. Guyot 282 But many states have adopted the Uniform Foreign
Money-Judgments Recognition Act (Uniform Act) that largely codifies the Hilton princi-
ples, to govern the enforcement of foreign court judgments.
One important development regarding enforcement of foreign judgments is the Hague
Conference on Private International Law's conclusion of the Convention on Choice of
Court Agreements on June 30, 2005.2s3 The Convention includes provisions that govern
the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments that result from proceedings based
upon exclusive choice of court agreements.284
B. RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS
1. Applicability of the New York Convention to an Award Made and Sought to be Enforced in
the United States
In Jacada (Europe), Ltd. v. International Marketing Strategies, the Sixth Circuit addressed
the question of whether an arbitral award made in the United States could be considered
non-domestic for the purpose of enforcement under the New York Convention."' Jacada
and International Marketing Strategies (IMS) had entered into a contract that included a
general choice of law provision designating the laws of Michigan as the law governing the
contract. The contract also included an arbitration clause, providing that disputes would
be decided in Kalamazoo, Michigan by the American Arbitration Association (AAA) in
h. Contributed by Jennifer Toole, Attorney-Adviser, Office of the Legal Adviser, United States Department
of State. The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Department of State or
the United States Government.
281. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards ("New York Conven-
tion"), June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T 2517, TIAS. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, implemented by Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (2005). The New York Con-
vention does not apply in cases where a non-signatory State is party to the underlying arbitration. See, e.g.,
Int'l Bechtel Co., Ltd. v. Dept. of Civil Aviation of Dubai, 360 E Supp.2d 136 (D.D.C. 2005) (applying 9
U.S.C. §§ 1 and 9 to the dispute rather than 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 because Dubai was not a signatory to the
New York Convention).
282. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
283. The text of the Convention is reprinted in 44 I.L.M. 1291 (Nov. 2005).
284. An exclusive choice of court agreement, as defined by article 3(a) of the Convention is an agreement
that "designates, for the purpose of deciding disputes which have arisen or may arise in connection with a
particular legal relationship, the courts of one Contracting State or one or more specific courts of one Con-
tracting State to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts."
285. SeeJacada (Europe), Ltd. v. Int'l Mktng. Strategies, Inc., 401 E3d 701 (6th Cir. 2005).
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accordance with the AAA arbitration rules.116 Following a dispute between the parties, the
AAA issued an award in favor of IMS. On the same day, Jacada filed an action to vacate the
arbitral award in Michigan state court and IMS filed an action to enforce the award in
federal district court. The state vacatur action was removed to the district court and con-
solidated with the enforcement action. The district court upheld the arbitration award.
On appeal, Jacada complained that its vacatur action should never have been removed to
federal court because the arbitration agreement was not within the scope of the New York
Convention. In order to address this complaint, the Sixth Circuit undertook an analysis of
what constitutes non-domestic for purposes of the New York Convention. It rejected Ja-
cada's argument that it should apply the common law standard set forth in Lander Co. v.
MMP Investments, Inc. for determining whether an award is foreign or domestic.2"7 Instead,
the court found that the New York Convention's implementing legislation creates a defi-
nition of what is non-domestic: "[aln agreement or award ... which is entirely between
citizens of the United States shall be deemed not to fall under the Convention unless that
relationship involves property located abroad, envisages performance or enforcement abroad,
or has some other reasonable relation with one or more foreign states."28 s Because Jacada
was incorporated in the United Kingdom, the contract contemplated overseas performance
and the underlying dispute involved events taking place abroad, the court concluded that
the award was non-domestic under the New York Convention and the action for vacatur
was properly removed to federal court.8 9
Having decided that the New York Convention was applicable, the court next turned to
the question of whether any of the grounds set forth in article V of the Convention per-
mitted refusal of enforcement. Specifically, the court considered article V(1)(e), which per-
mits the refusal of enforcement where "the award ... has been set aside or suspended by a
competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was
made."2 In order to decide this issue, the court analyzed whether the district court had
erred in denying Jacada's request for vacatur.
First, the Court of Appeals determined that it was appropriate for the district court to
apply the federal standard of vacatur, which is less thorough than the Michigan standard
that Jacada had argued for. It held that the Michigan choice of law clause in the contract
did not displace the federal standard for vacatur under the Federal Arbitration Act.29' Sec-
ond, the court determined that the arbitration panel's decision to disregard a limited liability
provision in the contract did not amount to a manifest disregard of the law, which would
have required vacatur under the FAA.292 In the underlying arbitration, the AAA panel dis-
regarded the limited liability provision on the grounds that it was "unreasonable and un-
286. See id. at 703.
287. Under the Lander standard, "[aIn arbitration award made in and sought to be enforced in the United
States is a domestic award according to traditional principles of Anglo-American conflicts of law, under which
the law of the place of the award determines whether the award is valid." Lander Co., Inc. v. MMP Inv., Inc.,
107 F3d 476, 482 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAwS § 220, cmt. C (1971))
(emphasis added).
288. Jacada (Europe), 401 E3d at 706 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 202).
289. Id. at 709.
290. Id.
291. See id. at 709-12.
292. See id. at 712-15.
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conscionable and ... that it fails of its essential purpose."2 93 The court concluded that "the
arbitrators' award does not display manifest disregard of Michigan's law concerning failure
of an essential purpose or unconsionability."294 As a result, the court affirmed the district
court's judgment upholding the arbitration award.
2. The Improper Composition of the Arbitral Tribunal as a Ground for Non-Enforcement
In Encyclopaedia Universalis S.A. v. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., the Second Circuit re-
viewed a district court's denial of enforcement of an arbitral award rendered in Luxem-
bourg. 95 The first ground invoked by Encyclopaedia Britannica (EB) in defense of enforce-
ment was found in article V(1)(d) of the New York Convention that permits denial of
enforcement upon a showing that "the composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral
procedure was not in accordance with the parties' agreement."296 The underlying arbitration
agreement had set forth specific procedures for the composition of the arbitral tribunal that
were not followed.297 The court agreed with the district court that enforcement should be
refused under the New York Convention because the third arbitrator was selected through
a procedure not agreed upon by the parties. 9s
The Court of Appeals did not agree, however, with the district court's denial of enforce-
ment on the second ground invoked by EB, that the arbitrators exceeded their powers. In
reaching its conclusion, the district court relied on two cases where enforcement was refused
under grounds set forth in the Federal Arbitration Act, other than from the exclusive
grounds enumerated in article V of the New York Convention. The Circuit Court ex-
plained, "[w]hile it is true that the FAA and the New York Convention provide 'overlapping
coverage' to the extent they do not conflict, we have held that a district court is strictly
limited to the seven defenses under the New York Convention when considering whether
to confirm a foreign award."2 Because the New York Convention does not permit the
refusal of enforcement in the event that arbitrators exceed their powers, the court reversed
the district court's holding on this ground.3°°
293. Id. at 712.
294. Jacada (Europe), 401 3d at 715. On this point, CircuitJudge Clay dissented from the majorityopinion
on the ground that the arbitrators ignored Michigan law in disregarding the limited liability provision. Judge
Clay believed that the portion of the award that involved the calculation of damages should be remanded to
the arbitrators for further findings under Michigan law. See id. at 715-18 (concurring and dissenting in part).
295. Encyclopedia Universalis S.A. v. Encyclopedia Brittanica, Inc., 403 E3d 85 (2d Cir. 2005).
296. Id. at 91-91.
297. These included that "(1) the arbitrators must 'disagree' before appointing a third arbitrator; (2) the two
party-appointed arbitrators must attempt to choose a third arbitrator; and (3) upon the failure of the two party-
appointed arbitrators to agree on a third, the Tribunal must appoint one from the [British Chamber of Com-
merce's] list." Id. at 90.
298. See id. at 91-92.
299. Id. at 92 (internal citations omitted).
300. The Circuit Court also vacated the district court's issuance of a supplemental remedy. After it denied
enforcement of the arbitral award, the district court had ordered that Encyclopaedia Universalis's party-
appointed arbitrator and the third arbitrator were disqualified from any future arbitration. It also held that
upon disagreement between the new party-appointed arbitrators as to the appointment of a third, an arbitrator
should be selected from the London Court of International Arbitration (as the appointing authority agreed
upon in the arbitration clause no longer existed). The Circuit Court found that the district court lacked the
authority to create this supplemental remedy. See id. at 92.
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C. RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN COURT JUDGMENTS
1. Application of the Uniform Act and Principles of Comity
In Society of Lloyd's v. Reinhart, the Tenth Circuit affirmed two district courts' grants of
summary judgment recognizing English money judgments against nine American defen-
dants. 0' A number of district courts in other states granted summary judgment to the
Society of Lloyds in similar enforcement actions this year.302 These enforcement proceed-
ings all arose from suits brought by Lloyds in England against multiple American insurance
underwriters (members of Lloyds, commonly referred to as "Names") who did not pay re-
insurance premiums assessed by Lloyds as part of a reorganization program. 303 Lloyds paid
the premiums, received an assignment, and sued the non-paying Names in English court
for the amounts paid. 30' The English court ruled in Lloyds' favor, entering a judgment
against each of the Names. 03
In Reinhart, federal district courts in New Mexico and Utah separately reached the same
conclusion that Lloyd's motions for summary judgment enforcing the English judgments
should be granted. The Tenth Circuit consolidated the cases on appeal. In examining the
New Mexican Name's defenses to enforcement, the court applied the Uniform Money-
Judgment Recognition Act (Uniform Act), adopted by the State of New Mexico.3°6 In the
Utah case, however, the court examined the defenses of the Utah Names under principles
of comity because Utah has not adopted the Uniform Act.307
The New Mexico Name opposed enforcement of the English judgment against it on the
grounds that it was denied due process and that the judgment was repugnant to New
Mexico's public policy. The Court of Appeals rejected both arguments. First, the court
stressed that it was not the fairness of the specific judgment that was to be evaluated, but
instead whether the English judicial system itself comported with due process principles.
On this point, it concluded that "when we look to the basic fairness of the system, the
answer is clear: 'Our courts have long recognized that the courts of England are fair and
301. Society of Lloyds v. Reinhart, 402 E3d 982 (10th Cir. 2005).
302. See, e.g., Society of Lloyds v. Edelman, No. 03 Civ. 4921 (WAHP), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4231
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2005); Society of Lloyds v. Shell, C-1-04-188, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22104 (S.D. Ohio
Sept. 30, 2005); Society of Lloyds v. Campbell-White, No. 03-10950-RCL, 2005 U.S. Dist. 22403 (D. Mass.
Aug. 20, 2005); seealso Society of Lloyds v. Blackwell, No. 03-56144, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 6455 (unpublished)
(affirming summary judgment of district court).
303. See Reinbart, 402 F.3d at 988-92 (discussing the facts of the underlying English litigation common to
the Lloyds enforcement actions across the United States).
304. See id. at 991.
305. See id.
306. See id. at 994. Under the Uniform Act, as incorporated into the New Mexico Code,
"[a] foreign judgment is not conclusive" if the judgment was rendered under a system that does not
provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law; and
it "need not be recognized if:" (1) the defendant in the proceedings in the foreign court did not receive
notice of the proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to defend; (2) the judgment was obtained by
fraud; [or] (3) the cause of action on which the judgment is based is repugnant to the public policy of
[the] state ....
Id. (quoting N.M. Stat. Ann. § 39-4B-5) (emphasis removed).
307. Id. at 998-99.
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neutral forums."'308 Second, the court reviewed and denied the New Mexico Name's various
claims that the English judgment was repugnant to New Mexico's public policy."°9
In evaluating the Utah Names' defenses, the court applied the comity-based principles
set forth in Hilton v. Guyot. 11 As it did with respect to the New Mexico Name's due process
complaint, the court evaluated the English system of justice, rather than the fairness of the
particular judgments against the Utah Names and reiterated that "the English judicial sys-
tem is procedurally beyond reproach."3" It then went on to reject the Utah Names' alle-
gations of error by the district court with respect to matters of discovery and certification
of state law."2 But it did find that the district court erred in one material respect. The court
held that the district court had improperly assessed post-judgment interest at the English
rate (8 percent), rather than the applicable U.S. rate (1.16 percent), and remanded this
narrow issue to the district court with instructions.313
2. Non-Enforcement Based on Repugnance to Public Policy
In Sarl Louis Feraud International v. Viewfinder, Inc, the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York denied enforcement of a French judgment on the
ground that it was "repugnant to the public policy" of the State of New York.14 Sarl Louis
Feraud and Pierre Balmain, French corporations in the business of designing and marketing
high-fashion clothing, brought suit against Viewfinder, an American corporation that main-
tains a fashion-dedicated website, in French court for unauthorized use of intellectual prop-
erty and unfair competition. Viewfinder did not appear in the French action and a default
judgment was issued against it.
The court evaluated Viewfinder's defenses to enforcement under New York's Uniform
Foreign Judgment Recognition Act. Aside from an argument that was mooted by events,"5
Viewfinder based its defenses on the Uniform Act's exception to the presumption of en-
forcement in cases where to do so would be contrary to public policy. In the first place,
308. Id. at 994 (internal citation omitted).
309. The Court (1) declined to apply or find a conflict with New Mexico's securities laws; (2) found no
unconscionability in the contracts upon which the English judgments were based; (3) did not consider the
agreements between the New Mexico Name and Lloyds to amount to a cognovit note prohibited under New
Mexico law; and (4) found that the New Mexico Unfair Practices Act did not apply. See Reinhart, 402 E3d at
995-98.
310. Under these principles foreign judgments deserve recognition where
(1) there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial abroad before a court of competent jurisdiction,
(2) conducting the trial upon regular proceedings, after due citation or voluntary appearance of the
defendant, (3) under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice
between the citizens of its own country and those of other countries, (4) there is nothing to show either
prejudice in the court, or in the system of laws under which it was sitting, or fraud in procuring the
judgment, or (5) no other special reason exists indicating why the comity of this nation should not
allow it full effect.
Hilton, 159 U.S. at 202.
311. Reinhart, 402 E3d at 1000.
312. Id. at 1000-02. It also rejected arguments, unique to one of the Utah Names, that no diversity juris-
diction was present and that the English judgment was in conflict with the Utah Securities Act. Id. at 1002-03.
313. Id. at 1003-05.
314. Sarl Louis Feraud Int'l v. Viewfinder, Inc., 406 E Supp. 2d 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
315. Viewfinder's original motion included an argument that the French judgment was not a final judgment,
and therefore not enforceable. Subsequently, the plaintiffs took steps to have matters finalized. See id. at 277.
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Viewfinder argued that the French law governing the calculation of damages involved an
approach that was disfavored in New York and that therefore the judgment should not be
enforced. The court, however, declined to find that this difference in approach amounted
to repugnance. 1 6 Nor did the court find that differences between U.S. copyright law and
French copyright law as applied in the judgment were sufficient to block enforcement "since
the alleged differences do not involve 'fundamental notions of what is decent and just' in
New York."' 7 The court did, however, ultimately deny enforcement because it found that
Viewfinder's conduct-a form of expression through the postings on its website-was un-
questionably protected by the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and article One,
Section Eight of the New York State Constitution."' The court held, therefore, that to
enforce the French judgment penalizing such expression would be repugnant to the public
policy of New YorkA' 9
316. Id. at 279-80.
317. Id. at 281.
318. Id. at 281-85.
319. Id. The First Amendment issue in connection with a foreign judgment has also been addressed in Yahoo
v. LICRA, 433 F3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006).
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